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.. Who Pays FHA-VA Discount Points?"
By Donald Guy
Dr. Guy is an assistant professor
of real estate and land use economics in the College of Business
Administration at the University of
Nebraska at Omaha.

The purpose of this study was to
measure empirically the extent to which
FHA and VA discount points are passed
on to residential buyers in Omaha,
Nebraska, and to compare the results
with previous studies in Columbus, Ohio,
and Lubbock, Texas.
A controversy exists as to who actually
pays discount points on FHA and VA
mortgages. These mongage programs
were established by federal law and have
interest rate ceilings set by the federal
government. The ceiling rate can be
adjusted up or down but has traditionally
been kept below the market interest rate
on comparable conventional mongages.
Federal officials intentionally keep the
ceiling below the market rate. The
justification given is that this will assist
moderate income families to purchase
homes and will help restrain interest rates
on conventional mongages. Private lending institutions that ongmate these
mortgages require that discount points be
paid at closing in order to raise the yield
on the mortgages up to the yield on
conventional mongages. 1 Since the lenders are prohibited by law from charging
discounts to the buyer, the seller must
pay these charges to the lending institution in order for the buyer to receive the
loan and complete the sales transaction.
FHA/VA Buyer Pays More
Since the requirement to pay discounts
reduces the net return on the sale, a

rational seller would be expected to
charge a higher price to an FHA or VA
buyer. For example, if the seller anticipated that lenders would require four
discount points (where one point equals 1
percent of the loan amount) and the
seller wanted to net $50,000 on the sale,
he might list the house at $52,000. If the
seller accepted an offer at $52,000 which
required a $52,000 VA loan, he would
have to pay the lender $2,080 in discounts
in order for the buyer to get the loan (at
four discount points). In effect, the seller
would reduce the net amount received by
$80 while the buyer would really be
paying $2,000 of the discount in the
form of a higher purchase price. The
seller would be as well off with a contract
requiring conventional financing at a
selling price of $49,920.
Ideally, the seller would like to raise
the price to the FHA/VA buyer by the
amount of the discount in order to
receive the same net sale price as would
be received from a conventional buyer.
This would require that the seller be
aware of the amount of the discount
prior to accepting an offer (and thus prior
to the buyer making a loan application to
the mongage lender). The seller is funher
constrained in passing on the discount by
the requirement that the propeny must
be appraised at the contract price or
higher for the buyer to obtain FHA or
VA financing. (If the appraised value is
less than the contract price, the buyer has
the option of making a larger down
payment and completing the transaction or of voiding the purchase agreement). Even if the seller knows how
much would have to be added in order to
pass on all of the discount, the seller must
be concerned about what price could be
justified by an appraisal or risk having the
contract voided after the appraisal.

Thus, the controversy arises as to what
ponion of the discount points will
actually be passed on to the buyer in the
form of a higher selling price. A knowledge
of what portion of the discounts are
added to the selling price would obviously
be of interest to potential buyers and
sellers as well as to real estate brokers,
salespersons, and appraisers. While the
controversy is of long standing, only
recently have empirical studies been
undertaken to determine whether or not
discounts are passed on to the buyer.
Ohio Study
The first empirical study was done
by Zerbst and Brueggeman (1978, 1978).
They collected cross section data based
on a sample of 276 sales through the
multiple listing service in Columbus,
Ohio, in June 1973. They ran a regression
analysis using a ratio of sale price to
asking price as the dependent variable but
did not explain their decision to do this.
The rationale would seem to be that most
sellers build points into their asking price.
If a potential buyer is going to make an
offer which included conventional financing, a knowledgeable buyer would offer
less than the asking price. An offer that
reduced the asking price by no more than
the amount of points built into that price
should be readily acceptable to the seller.
If the potential buyer will require FHA or
VA financing, the buyer has less bargaining leverage and must offer the asking
price or, at least, closer to the asking
price than the conventional buyer. Many
other circumstances would also affect the
relative bargaining position of the buyer
and the seller.
To the extent that this model focuses
on the pricing expectations of the seller,
this is a reasonable way to approach the
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question of sellers anticipating the
requirement to pay FHA or VA discount
points. The full regression equation is
shown below:
SP/AP = .96 + .0227FHA + .0306VA
(59.71) (3.84) (5.36)
+ .0125 L/V- .002 Time
(.64)
(3.21)
R2 = .21
The term SP/AP is the ratio of selling
price to asking price. For example, if
a seller listed his house at $52,000 but
accepted a contract for $50,000, the ratio
would be 50,000/52,000 or .962. The
FHA and VA terms are represented by
dummy variables which are assigned a
value of 1 for sales using that type of
financing and 0 for sales with other types
of financing. The L/V term is the loan to
value ratio where value is represented by
selling price. For example, if a buyer
bought a $50,000 house with a conventional mortgage that required a $10,000
downpayment, the loan to value ratio
would be $40,000 (mortgage amount)/
$50,000 (value) or .8 for that sale. The
time variable in this model represents the
number of days between listing and
selling the property (time on market).
Regression Analysis
The results of the regression analysis

indicate that 42.5 percent of FHA points
and 56 percent of VA po ints are passed
on to the buyer in the form of a higher
selling price. 2 This is consistent with the
hypothesis that sellers build discount
points into the asking price. The coefficient on the time variable is negative
which means that the longer the house is
on the market, the lower the ratio of sale
price to asking price. This conclusion
could be interpreted as saying that
"overpriced" houses take longer to sell
(or the longer the house is on the market,
the more the seller is amenable to accepting a lower offer). The t ratios are shown
in parentheses below each term. All of
the t ratios are statistically significant (at
the .05 level) except for the L/V term. 3
The value of R 2 indicates that 21 percent
of the variation in the SP/AP ratio is
explained by the regression equation.
The value of R 2 would be expected to
be low because of the many other
possible influences on asking price and
selling price.
Texas Study
Karl Gunterman (1978, 1979) did a
similar study for Lubbock, Texas, but
examined only FHA sales. He collected
sales data on 2,408 houses that were

sold during the period 1970-1975. He ran
a regression analysis using sale price as the
dependent variable, and the results are
shown below:
SP = 9864 + 12.6 Size- 346.0 Age
(33 .2)
(69.4)
(52.7)
-163.5 Time+ 474.5 FHA
(57.1)
(4.1)
R 2 = .83
The size variable is the square foot area of
the house, age is the chronological age of
the house as of the year of sale, time is
the number of months from the month of
the sale until the end of 1975, and the
FHA variable is a dummy variable which
takes a value of 1 for FHA sales and 0 for
other financing methods. The time
variable was used to account for a time
trend in sales price since the data included
sales over a five year period. The results
indicate that a purchaser paid approximately $4 7 5 more for a house if the
purchase was financed FHA rather than
with
conventional financing, other
influences held constant. Based on the
average discount paid over the study
period, this represents a pass through of
about 73 percent of the FHA discounts.
This result is consistent with the earlier
study, but it indicates a larger proportion
of the discount is passed through.
Gunterman extended the an-alysis in
Lwu ways. Since the data covered a five
year period and discounts charged vary
over time, he added a series of dummy
variables representing different numbers
of points depending on the quarter in
which the sale was closed and the number
of discount points being charged at the
end of the quarter. This analysis indicated
that the greater the discount, the larger
the proportion of the discount passed to
the buyer.
Gunterman also divided the data into
three price categories and repeated the
regression analysis with each group.4 He
concluded that FHA points were not
passed through in the lowest price category
and that a greater proportion of the
discounts were passed through on sales in
the higher priced homes as compared to
the middle priced range.
Omaha Study
In order to estimate the extent to
which FHA and VA discounts are passed
to buyers in Omaha, data were collected
o n a sample of 611 sales that took place
in the period January to March, 1977.
This period was chosen because mortgage
interest rates were stable during this
period and the ceiling interest rate on
FHA/VA loans was unchanged. All of the
sales were arranged through brokers, and

only houses with sale prices of $4 5 ,000
and below were considered so that all of
the sales would have been eligible for
FHA financing. Data were collected on
listing price, sale price, time on the
market, square feet in the house, number
of bedrooms, chronological age of the
house, and financing terms. 5 Some of
these data are reported in Tables 14. The
data there indicate that the average listing
price was $29,199, but the amount
ranged from $3,000 to $48,950. The
mean sale price averaged $2 7,972; the
average FHA sale was $23,470, while
V A-financed sales averaged $2 7,292 and
conventional loans in the sample averaged
$32,263. The average ratio of the selling
price to the asking price ranged from
.9707 for FHA homes to .9534 for
homes financed by conventional loans.
A regressio n was run using the Zerbst
and Brueggeman model (except for loan
to value ratio as previously explained).
Time on the market was found to be not
statistically significant and was dropped
from the analysis. The resulting regression
results are shown below.6
SP/AP = .94 + .0306 FHA+ .0264 VA
(246.82) (4.23) (3.64)
R2 = .04
The t statistics are shown in parentheses
below each term. These results are consistent with the Zerbst and Brueggeman
study but would indicate that more of
the discounts are passed on in FHA than
in VA sales. The percent passed through
was higher for both with 96 percent of
FHA and 80 percent of VA points passed
on to buyers.7 To the extent that the
model focuses on seller expectations, the
difference could reflect differences in
expectations in the two markets.
A second regression was run using
two variables not included in the previous
studies. As complete age data weren't
available, distance to the central bus!ness
district was used as a crude proxy. Houses
closest to the CBD would generally be the
oldest houses with age decreasing with
distance from the CBD. The second
variable added was quality as measured
by price per square foot. Measured in this
way, quality could combine several
features such as better materials used in
construction, better condition, or more
built-in appliances. The results of the
second regression are shown below :
SP/AP = .88 + .0366 FHA+ .0281VA
(85.72) (5.19)
(4.02)
+ .0020 Qual. + .0029 Dist.
(5.61)
(1.91)
R2 = .12
The coefficient on the quality variable
has a positive sign and is statistically
significant. This means that the seller of a

higher quality house will sell at closer to
the asking price than would the seller of a
lower quality house. This result is
reasonable in that the condition of the
house would be expected to affect the
relative bargaining power of the seller.
The distance variable (as a proxy for age)
has the expected sign. The greater the
distance from the CBD (the newer the
house) the closer the sale price to the
asking price. The coefficient on the
distance variable is not quite significant at the .05 level (critical t value is
1.96) . The R2 is substantially higher in
the second regression. The coefficients on
the FHA and VA variables are slighdy
higher (and statistically significant) but
are of the same order of magnitude as in
the regression model which incorporates
only the financial terms. This lends
additional support to the conclusions of
the first regression model.
Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from
these three studies? Gunterman studied
only FHA financing. His analysis produced much higher R 2 than either of the
other studies, but this would be expected
since he was using selling price as his
dependent variable. He also included size

logically are less fully passed through.
Another sample could be taken when
discount requirements were higher th an
those in the Columbus study better
to establish this result. There are some
limits to the statistical analysis of this
problem. If one is primarily interested
in knowing how knowledgeable sellers
are about discount points, a better
research methodology might be to survey
homeowners who have listed their houses
for sale and ask them if they knew what
discounts are and what level of discounts
were being charged by local lenders at
that time.
FOOTNOTES
1
One discount point equals one percent of
the mortgage amount. The number of points
charged for a particular mortgage depends
primarily o n the spread between the cei ling
rate and the market i nterest rate. Discounting
raises the effective yield to the lender.

2 At the time o f the study, local lenders
charged an average of 5.75 discount points
for FHA and VA loans. Using mean asking
price, mean selling price, and FHA and VA
m ean loan t o value ratios from the sample
data. Zerbst and Brueggeman esti mate that,
on the average, 42.5 percent of FHA discount s
and 56 percent of VA discounts were passed on
t o buyers in t he f orm of higher selling prices.

1974 when the maximum
$45,000.

term indicates that the probable range of values
for the coefficient i ncl udcs the volue of zero.

included in the other two studies. He also
used data collected for a five year period
and thus had to take out the time trend
in prices. The other studies used a ratio of
selling price to asking price which would
seem to be a better way to approach the
problem of seller expectation. The Zerbst
and Brueggeman study also included loan
to value ratio which was not statistically
significant. Zerbst and Brueggeman found
time on market to be significant, but this
was not found to be significant in the
Omaha study.
While the three studies indicate
different amounts of points passed
through to sellers, they provide strong
support for the contention that substantial portions of the discounts are paid
indirecdy by buyers in the form of a
higher selling price. A comparison of the
Omaha and Columbus results suggests
that the higher the discount, the smaller
the percentage of the discount that will
be p assed on to the buyer. This is the
opposite of the conclusion drawn by
Gunterman. A rational seller would be
expected to pass o n as much of the
discount as possible. As noted previously,
the ap praisal requirement would effectively limit the total number of dollars
that could be passed through on the sale.
For these reasons, the larger discounts

Therefore. whether this variable should have
been included in the analysis is questionabl e.
4
The three price cat egories used by
Gunterman are $5,000-$14,999, $15,000$24,999, and $25,000 and above. Most of his
data are for sales below $40,000. The maximum FHA mortgage was $33,000 until August

raised to

5 The loan amount was not available, so the
loan t o value ratio used by Zerbst and
Brueggeman was not calculated. This llariable
was not fou nd to be statistically significant in
the Zerbst and Brueggeman study. The age
of many houses was shown as o lder . No age
was recorded tor these t ransactions. If age had
been included as a va riabl e. these sales would
have appeared as zero, wh ich would distort
the analysis. Thus, age was not included as a
va riable in the Omaha study.

6 The value of R2 • while quite low, is
statistically significant. While the regressi on
equation explains only a small part of the
variation in the ratio of selling price to asking
price. the analysis does indicate that the ratio
varies systematically depending on how the
transaction was financed.
7
The regression results indicate that the
ratio of sel li ng price to asking price is .0306
higher if the sale was financed FHA and .0264
higher if the sale was financed VA. The average
discount during the period studied was 3.5
points. Applying the methodology from the
Zerbst and Brueggeman study to the Omaha data
produces estimates of 96 percent of FHA and
80 percent of VA points passed on t o the
buyer in the form of a higher selling price.

TABLE 1
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Mean

3 The low va lue of this statistic for the L/V

and age of house which were not directly

was

Lowest

Highest

Listing
Price

$29,199 $3,000

$48,950

Sale Price

$27,972 $1,500

$45,000

Square
Feet

1,336

138

2.460

Time on
Market

57.25

1

421

T AB L E 2
NUMBER OF BEDROOMS AND SE LLIN G PRICE
Price Range

1

2

3

4&5

Total

Under $10,000
$10,000-20,000
$20 ,000-30 ,000
$30 ,000-40 ,000
$40 ,000-45 ,000

4
4
0
0
0

20
41
33
2
0

7
43
120
193
52
415

5
21
29
25
12

36
109
182
220
64
611

Total

-

-

96

8

-

92

TAB L E 3
F INANC IN G METHOD AND SELLING PRICE
Price Range
Under $10.000
$10,000-20,000
$20,000,30,000
$30,000-40,000
$40 .000-45,000
Total

CONV.~/

FHA

VA

7
42
57
25
2

6
24
51
42
9

3
11
31
58
27

132

130

133

-

CONV. PMI

-

Other

0
8
20
51
16

20
24
23
44
10

95

121

T otal

36
109
182
220
64
611

~/ Conventional loans require at least 20 percent down. Conventional loans with less
than 20 percent down require private mortgage insurance and are shown as CONV-PMI.
Other financing includes cash sales. assumptions, and land co ntracts.

Pa e 4
This methodology requires a series of steps.
The regression coefficient times the average
asking price equals the dollars passed through.
The average selling price times the average
FHA (or VA) loan to value ratio equals the
average loan. The average loan times the average
discount equals the amount of the discount.
The dollars passed through divided by the
amount of the discount equals the proportion
of the discount points passed through to the
buyer.
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TABLE 4
FINANCING METHOD,
MEAN SELLING PRICE,
AND MEAN SP/AP
Method
Financing

Mean
Selling
Price

Mean Sale Price
Asking Price

FHA
VA
CONV

$23,470
$27,292
$32,263

.9707
.9665
.9534
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